If you were to go back two weeks to the Hungarian Grand Prix weekend, with the asphalt at times touching almost 50°C, few would have thought that the one-stop strategy was possible. In that case, only one driver took the gamble, Yuki Tsunoda who, thinking smartly together with his team, managed to make a tactic work that earned him tenth place ahead of the two Aston Martins. An idea that was not planned, but rather born during the race thanks to a good reading of the situation.
Similarly, a week later in Belgium, almost no one thought that the one-stop strategy was feasible, so much so that Pirelli had excluded it from its alternatives. The factors that had weighed on the situation were some of the elements encountered on Friday, such as the high degradation and graining problems observed during free practice.
Everyone was worried about the excessive degradation seen on Friday, even with cooler temperatures, so there were fears about what the consumption could be on Sunday. Several elements fueled the doubts: the rain that had cleaned the track, the difference in grip and abrasiveness between the two different asphalts, the thermal stress in the fast corners of the second sector and the possible graining.
Fernando Alonso, Aston Martin AMR24, makes a pit stop
Foto di: Steven Tee / Motorsport Images
Yet, on Sunday afternoon, five cars out of twenty tried that strategy that seemed almost unthinkable, namely the single stop. In the case of George Russell, it was probably also his condemnation, due to the consumption recorded by extending the second stint. However, for others this tactic was also the winning weapon, such as Fernando Alonso, who scored an excellent eighth place ahead of Esteban Ocon’s Alpine and Daniel Ricciardo’s Racing Bulls.
As Mario Isola explained, in fact the one-stop strategy was not initially planned, but there were some elements that contributed to making it possible: “The one-stop strategy was not in the plans. Looking at the level of degradation that we measure on Friday, in the race the level of consumption was much lower without graining on the mediums”.
Why Aston chose the single stop on the fly
However, the most interesting aspect of the story is understanding how the idea of the single stop matured, as it happened in the case of the two Aston Martins. “We had plans, plan B, plan C and more. We covered the single stops and the triple stops, and in the end it was just a coincidence that we were in twelfth position,” explained Fernando Alonso.
“We were waiting for the Safety Car to come out and with eleven laps to go we started to think that it wasn’t going to come out, but at the same time maybe we could get to the end. It was about being very flexible and evaluating the conditions lap by lap, and in the end it was the right choice, but it wasn’t planned to do a single stop from the beginning,” the Spaniard added.
Fernando Alonso, Aston Martin AMR24
Photo by: Zak Mauger / Motorsport Images
A story that, in fact, reflects reality, as confirmed by the team radio. The idea was born from the team itself, which, after about an hour of racing, analyzing the standings and the low degradation, suggested to both Alonso and Stroll to keep going until the finish line. The Spaniard was in fact on the edge of the top ten, while the Canadian was out of the points, even behind Valtteri Bottas, which is why trying something different, also using Stroll as a “shield”, could turn into an idea worth trying.
The decision, in fact, was not only made by looking at the standings, but also at the tyre consumption during the evolution of the race. Given the reset on Saturday, the track improved significantly during the course of the Grand Prix, with a marked evolution that helped reduce tyre consumption lap after lap, making the one-stop strategy an increasingly concrete possibility, given the concreteness of the hard.
Why the Aston Tactic Worked
“The hard compound was good since Friday, but on paper it was slower. We had estimated a rather marked delta in terms of lap time compared to the medium, which is why last year the teams also opted for two stops using the medium and the soft,” added Isola.
“In my opinion, the new asphalt played a role. The grip level of the hard was better. In terms of lap time it was slower than the medium, but the hard was very consistent, without graining and without abrasions. Wear was not a problem in itself, initially the one stop was not thought to be convenient due to the high degradation, but Russell pushed in the last laps and the tyre held up well”.
Fernando Alonso, Aston Martin AMR24
Photo by: Sam Bagnall / Motorsport Images
The lower degradation than expected and the good reading of the race were two important factors in Aston’s choice, but this clearly did not guarantee the success of the strategy. In the case of the Silverstone team, two other elements helped: the additional load compared to the opponents and the track position, since overtaking proved complicated, also due to the reduction of the DRS zone.
“In our case, the track position was crucial because the Williams and the Alpines were quicker and if you fall behind, the race is over. In the end, our car, thanks to the extra downforce, perhaps took care of the tyres a little better and made the single stop possible. It was a compromise and I think it was the right choice for us,” explained Alonso. In fact, compared to Alpine and Williams, who had opted for a very light rear wing, Aston Martin had followed the opposite approach, aiming for a more loaded solution that allowed for better balancing of the two axles, protecting the front but without sacrificing too much the rear.
The differences with the Russell case
Clearly, with Russell’s disqualification, a different question arose: given that Aston Martin also followed the same tactic, how is it possible that the Silverstone team did not suffer the same fate? Having a precise and exact answer is very complex, but there are some aspects to consider by putting the two cases side by side. First of all, according to what Isola explained, during a stint each tire can lose up to a kilo of weight, but with the pick-up during the in-lap after the finish line each tire can recover between 300 and 400 grams due to the marbles.
Each car wears out the tyres differently, but it is clear that greater stress in the traction phase or in high-speed corners can somehow accentuate the degradation. Looking at the time table, an important element emerges clearly, that is the difference in pace between the Spaniard and George Russell, which in the first part of the second stint at times was even around a second and a half, even though the two-time world champion was initially in traffic.
Fernando Alonso, Aston Martin AMR24
Foto di: Steven Tee / Motorsport Images
This is also reflected in the speed of some corners, such as Pouhon, the most demanding on the tyres, where at the start of the stint the two were tackling it with a difference of around 12/13 km/h. When Alonso started to lap in free air, the gap narrowed, but it was always at least around 8/9 km/h. Clearly this is just one of the many aspects that may have contributed, but looking at the times, it is clear that Alonso’s times improved until the end of the race, while Russell’s had a more fluctuating trend.
Even in the phase in which the Briton tried to save the tyres to prepare for the final assault by Hamilton, the difference in pace was still in favour of the Mercedes driver, albeit reduced to half a second. A delta that reopened only in the final laps, when Russell returned to push to defend himself from his teammate. Undoubtedly, there are many factors that could have influenced this, starting with the fact that Aston may have a slightly heavier car or may have taken a greater margin than Mercedes on ballast. However, in a race in which thermal degradation did not play a key role as expected, it is possible that the difference in pace in some points could have helped Aston to safeguard the tyres differently.
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