Europe USA Russia: the stages of the escalation
In an article of mine published on Affaritaliani.it on September 1, 2023, so almost a year ago, I argued that the military-only solution, which envisaged the continuation of the fighting between Ukraine and Russia until the Russian troops were pushed back within their borders, was indeed satisfactory from the point of view of moral purism, since it excluded any concession, and therefore unjust reward, to Russia, but of doubtful feasibility and even desirability, since it could lead to the destruction of Ukraine and the death in battle of all Ukrainian soldiers. I also remembered that the American military and politicians jokingly said that they would continue to “help”Ukraine “down to the last Ukrainian”, down to the last Ukrainian.
To this perplexity of mine there have been different answers in the conversations and exchanges that I have had with friends and acquaintances. Some replied that in the Second World War the Russians lost 14 million people to repel the German invaders, but in the end they succeeded. And that this is universally considered as a noble proof of heroism and value of the Russians, not of a useless waste of lives. No one has ever dared to say that it was a question of 14 million wasted lives. In other words: if even the Ukrainians are doomed to extinction, from a historical point of view their sacrifice will be considered with the same reverence and gratitude as that of the Russians in the Second World War. Ukrainians can therefore continue to die peacefully and happily.. It seems to me a dubious form of Hegelianism. Here is a second argument: by sending weapons to the Ukrainians, we as true friends help them defend themselves. It is sad that this entails victims, but you know, this is war. In any case, they are the ones who must decide when to suspend the fight.
Our duty is to allow them to continue, if they want, until victory or, of course, total defeat. There is an interesting variant of this argument: we send them weapons to repel the invader. If there are victims, this is the fault of the invading Russians, not ours. We help them in a legitimate and even admirable effort. The bad guys are the Russians, the good guys are the Ukrainians and…us too. This argument has exactly the form of the defense that I have heard and read is made by admirers and defenders of every form of partisan struggle. The attack on Via Rasella was a duty for those who proposed, patriotically, to drive the Nazi invaders from Italy.
The massacre of the Fosse Ardeatine was the fault of those who committed it, the criminal Nazis that our patriots intended to drive from our soil. Therefore the patriotic attackers of Via Rasella had NOTHING to do with the massacre of the Fosse Ardeatine. In the same way we shipowners of Ukraine have NOTHING to do with the Ukrainians who fall while holding our weapons. This argument seems to me a strange mixture of cynicism and Weberian ethics of intention: let justice be done, let the world perishor better, let Ukraine perish. There are two other positions. Moral purists do not pose the problem on principle, as I just mentioned: for them it does not exist and it would be a sign of moral weakness to admit that it does exist. I believe instead that the shipowners of Ukraine in 2022 did not pose it, in their vast majority, because they thought that the war would be short-lived and would end with the expulsion or destruction of those ridiculous scrap metal, the Russian tanks, and with the economic ruin of Russia caused by our inexorable sanctions.
Things did not go that way. Already in my above-mentioned article I observed that the conflict had transformed into a technological and industrial race between the great imperial power, the Usawhich wants to continue to reign undisturbed, and Russia, which has revealed itself to be less shaky, rusty and backward than its inglorious entry into Ukraine had left one to think. And even then I observed that there was always one last weapon that the Ukrainians lacked, one that if it had been delivered to them quickly, would have turned the tide of the war in their favor. This marvelous weapon is always there, and we rush to deliver it to them every time. It has this strange characteristic: it loses its decisive power as soon as it is delivered, to pass it on to the one that is the object of the next request.
What has happened in the last year? I would say two series of events and a new strategic consideration. A series of statements and interviews (Stoltenberg, Schroeder, Bennet, Merkel) that confirm what non-rearmists have always thought about Russian foreign policy, a deciphering of which often boils down to guessing Putin’s intentions by focusing on his sick mentality. Usually, rearmists think that the invasion of Ukraine is only the first step, if you will, the first bite, in the attempt to reestablish the borders of the Tsarist empire. Non-rearmists think that Russia has suffered with growing discomfort the famous “NATO’s Eastern Expansion” and had clearly indicated his absolute opposition to the entry of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO.
(Particularly notable is Merkel’s testimony that in 2008 she and Sarkozy opposed Ukraine’s immediate entry into NATO for several reasons, including that for Putin this act would have been tantamount to a declaration of war.) If that were the case, the conflict would be essentially local and could be resolved diplomatically by resuming the failed Minsk agreements and the quasi-agreement that had been outlined in Istanbul in March-April 2022. All European leaders, as well as the Americans of course, instead embrace the thesis of Putin as the second Hitlera looming threat to Europe and the world. They have already responded with facts to the challenge posed to them by Massimo Cacciari on Press of 13/VII/24: “Europe should tell us if it believes that escalation is the only way forward”: Europe believes it and has already set out on the ruinous path of escalation. The second novelty is the intensification of the conflict between the US – with NATO at their service – and Russia, which is occurring with a progressive loosening of all constraints on the use of weapons given to Ukraine to strike targets on Russian soil.
As Anna Zafesova cheerfully writes about Press of July 14th now “Ukrainian drones are repeatedly striking not only the territories occupied by the Russians, but also the deep Russia – fires of refineries, factories and military depots are now almost daily – even flying in front of the windows of the president’s office in the Kremlin.” This brings the deliveries of new weapons to Ukraine closer to acts of war against Russia by the countries of the Nato.
This is accompanied by a corresponding doubling of threats, between Russia and NATO and sometimes between the US, Russia, and the European countries of NATO. In reporting this, a strange asymmetry is created. For example, the US announcement of the intention to deploy long-range missiles in Germany went unnoticed, while Peskov’s response, that Russia also kept European cities within the range of its missiles, aroused outcry and indignation. The general Leonardo Tricaricointerviewed in the Press on July 14, commented that the US move “is a further cause of tension in an already overheated atmosphere… Instead of seeking reasons for détente, opposing elements are created.”
Note his caution. He does not dare to say “the US creates opposing elements”. He uses an impersonal grammatical subject, “they create themselves”. So there is a race to multiple doubling (“escalation”) underway that is very dangerous for the fate of the world. The third circumstance that exacerbates the conflict between the US-NATO and Russia, and contributes to the doubling, is that after the end of the famous but losing “Ukrainian counter-offensive” the Ukrainians are forced to retreat. Now, it is true that Ukraine is not in NATO. But it is a member in fact if not by right and has been for a long time, as Stoltenberg has repeatedly recalled with pride. The alliance of more than 40 countries set up by the US and NATO has failed to defeat the ramshackle Russia! Some politicians, both American and European, believe that this setback should be avoided at all costs. Note that this reaction to the failed Ukrainian military success is technically not an escalation, but a “feed-back”, a retroactive reaction. The war has created a powerful new incentive for its continuation and intensification: the United States cannot show the world that it loses, not even through a State proxy. How high are the costs? One should first ask for whom. In any case, there is no upper limit. All that remains is to hope that the peoples of Europe understand that the path already taken without hesitation, but also without reflection by their leaders, leads to atomic world war.
