Double European test in sight for the Meloni government and the parties that compose it: the elections and the match for the renewal of the heads of the Brussels institutions, the EU games will intertwine with the US ones and could be mutually influenced by them. In exactly one year, the citizens of the Union will go to the polls to elect their Parliament for the tenth time: they will vote, according to the methods established by each country, between 6 and 9 June, between a Thursday and a Sunday.
Once again, there will not be a uniform electoral law in the 27 EU states, despite appeals to this effect by pro-European movements: each will elect its own MEPs according to its own rules. Italy, which has 76 seats out of a total of 705, is divided into five constituencies, within which the seats will be assigned on a proportional basis.
Changing alliances
On the basis of the results of the latest policies and of the current polls, the composition of the Italian delegation in the Community Assembly is destined to undergo profound changes. Currently, the 76 seats are distributed as follows: 29 for the Lega, 19 for the Democratic Party, 14 for the M5S, 7 for Forza Italia, 6 for the Brothers of Italy and one for the South Tyrolean autonomists. It is conceivable that the positions of the League and the Brothers of Italy are almost reversed or that, in any case, there is an inversion of the balance of power between the two groups, while Pd, M5S and Forza Italia could also obtain results substantially equivalent to the current ones.
But the attention of Giorgia Meloni and Matteo Salvini, at this moment, is not focused only on the competition between their two movements, the outcome of which could also have an impact on the balance of government and – who knows – perhaps also on the stability of the executive. Meloni and Salvini are both exploring the possibilities of counting more in the EU institutions and, in particular, in the European Parliament, where their parties are currently both cut off from decision-making processes.
Despite the sovereign wave of the 2019 elections, the Strasbourg Assembly is in fact firmly controlled by the more or less sincerely pro-European groups, which form the majority: the Populars of the EPP – for Italy, there is Forza Italia – with 177 seats; the socialists and democrats – for Italy, the Pd – with 143 seats; the Greens with 101 seats; and the Liberals of Renew Europe with 72.
The “grillini”, after having formed a technical group in the previous legislation with the “brexiteers” of Nigel Farage, remained among the non-members, who are 47, with considerable organizational penalties. The Northern League are in the Identity and Democracy group with the French xenophobic Euro-sceptics of Marine Le Pen – 62 seats -, while FdI is in the European Conservatives and Reformists group with the Poles of Jaroslaw Kaczinsky – 66 seats -, the left instead has 37 seats and there are no Italians.
Different positions of the two Italian right-wing parties in the European Parliament could allow them to better mask sovereignist and Euro-sceptic tendencies, which are awkward to show when it comes to governing and seeking support, and make relations with the other more influential European parties more fluid, which they remain marked by caution and mistrust, beyond the supportive embraces in the face of emergencies such as the tragedy of the floods in Emilia-Romagna.
But changing alliances, finding a new location and acquiring influence is not easy and it is not even taken for granted, also taking into account the rules on the composition of groups in the Strasbourg Assembly. The Northern League, for example, look to the Ppe, where, moreover, there is a friend of Giorgia Meloni (more than Matteo Salvini) like the Hungarian premier Viktor Orbán, the theorist of authoritarian and illiberal democracy; but there is already an Italian party in the Ppe, Forza Italia.
Community challenges
The next term of the European Parliament will coincide with that of the European Commission, which will be renewed after the European elections, between the summer and autumn, and which will take office in November for the five-year period 2024-29. It will be a period potentially heralding big changes in the process of European integration: for example, on a German initiative and with the adhesion of nine countries, including Italy, a “Group of friends” has already been created to overcome the unanimously in foreign policy and finally give the Union a political dimension, as well as a monetary, economic, energy and environmental one.
Much obviously will depend on the outcome, or on the trend, if it were to continue, of the conflict in Ukraine: the Meloni government has so far entrusted its Euro-Atlantic credibility essentially to the adhesion without distinction to the positions of NATO and the EU on the war . On many other European fronts, the confrontation between Italy and its partners is often a contrast: it is enough to mention immigration, beach licenses, clean cars; the European Stability Mechanism, the famous Mes, to which Meloni opposes a no without appeal (“As long as I am in government, Italy will not access it”); the difficulties on the Pnrr, where delays are consoled because “uncommon half joy”, in the sense that even Romania and Slovakia – sic! – live our worries. And there is the negotiation on the reform of the Stability Pact, very delicate and to bring it to port which in a positive way for Italy will need banks in Paris and Berlin, not in Warsaw and Budapest.
In the renewal of the top positions of the European institutions, Meloni’s Italy does not seem to have much to say, at least for now and on paper. The confirmation of Ursula von der Leyen, 64, from Germany, is probable, not certain; that of the President of the European Council Charles Michel, 57 years old, Belgian, is possible, but uncertain. Michel’s could have been a tailor-made post for Mario Draghi, but it is unlikely that the current majority will nominate the former prime minister and former president of the ECB.
Paolo Gentiloni will not remain at the European Commission, because the new government will want to send someone he trusts – we are talking about the minister for European affairs, for cohesion policies and for the Pnrr Raffale Fitto, who has already been a European parliamentarian. The turnover, however, will probably be lost: Gentiloni manages the economic affairs of the Union; whoever succeeds him will have a less heavy wallet, also because he will have a less substantial “cursus honorum” – countries often send former prime ministers or former ministers of foreign affairs or the economy to the Commission.
Unless Meloni intends to spend one of his deputies on the European table – not the most vocal one, but the quietest one – Antonio Tajani, who has a first-rate European curriculum, was commissioner, deputy and president of the European Parliament. But he is from Forza Italia, the clay pot of the current majority.
The external scenarios
The renewal of the European institutions will go hand in hand with the electoral campaign in the United States. Brussels focuses on the renewal of the Biden – Ursula von der Leyen ticket. A Republican victory – Donald Trump or Ron DeSantis changes little – could instead change the data of the EU-US relationship.
The prospect of Trump’s return to the White House creates nervousness in Brussels, especially in Germany. The DeSantis hypothesis is not much more reassuring. Some of their positions – writes Politico – raise fears of “potentially seismic consequences” for the European Union: “Even just a cooling of US support for Ukraine and new pressure on European countries to spend more on defence, would create tensions between 27”.
The risk is that the EU will delude itself that Biden is in his place and bask in the belief that relations between the EU and the US will remain as rosy as they are now. In their speeches, Biden’s collaborators often mention the EU and Ursula von der Leyen and underline the alignment that exists on Ukraine and the need to reduce risks with China. There is also the desire to transform the US Inflation Reduction Act “from a source of friction (due to its potential protectionist content, ed.) into a mutual source of strength and reliability”.
And here comes von der Leyen’s chess match with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The EU, Politico always writes, “is seeking a new balance with China”, which “will determine our economic prosperity and our security”: a quest in which Italy’s choice to renew, or not, the pacts with Beijing it will have weight. The EU has a generally more open attitude towards China than the Americans, but Beijing already controls many European ports and sometimes exerts a conditioning influence.
The renewal of the Biden – Ursula von der Leyen ticket is in the auspices of Washington and Brussels. But the former German defense minister doesn’t just have friends: her relationship with Michel is not idyllic; and the coalition in power in Germany – of which her party, the CDU, is not a part – is pervaded by pro-China impulses; and France wants to keep the United States at arm’s length. Being too close to Biden and too little to Xi may not do her any good.
